Monday, 14 November, 2005  


Demands for dialogue, not solution to Myanmar democracy dispute

The solution to the problems in Myanmar democracy transition is review not dialogue.

Regarding Myanmar’s drive for democracy transition, the National League for Democracy demanded variously for dialogue, thus culminating in a halt to the National Convention that commenced in 1993. It has been constantly shouting national reconciliation and national solidarity. Up to now, nothing can break the deadlock in the drive for reunion of NLD and the Tatmadaw. The two sides are still in total disagreement over the democracy movement of the nation.

Why is it so? Is it because the Tatmadaw government does not accept any negotiations? Absolutely not. The 1993 National Convention, the grandest conference of its kind in Myanmar, was attended by representatives from all strata of life and political parties including delegates and representatives-elect of NLD and other representatives-elect.

Yet, billing the National Convention as a sham and saying that a lot of preparations still needed to be made for the NC, Daw Suu Kyi clang on to the policy of dialogue and was opposed to the NC. All the NLD delegates attending the National Convention including Chairman U Aung Shwe agreed to the Daw Suu Kyi’s attitude and protested against the NC, calling for dialogue. In consequence, the NC was adjourned in 1995.

As of 2002, UN special envoy Razali Ismail visited Myanmar many times for negotiations, resulting in several meetings between NLD and the Government. And it reached the stage of building trust.

After the restrictions on Daw Suu Kyi had been lifted, she was allowed to travel anywhere across the nation. When she visited some construction sites being implemented by the Government, officials concerned regarded her as a very important person and conducted her round the sites. The Tatmadaw government arranged the tours for her with the aim to enable her to understand its genuine attitude and to build trust with NLD.

However, later, on her way to Wuntho, Sagaing Division, Daw Suu Kyi levelled criticism against local people. So, she came under mass demonstrations against her along the route to upper Sagaing Division and Kachin State. In the end, Dabayin conflict put an end to her around-the-nation trip. In reality, her trip did not create anything except the Dabayin conflict.

Then, anti-government groups abroad resorted to various ways and means to take organizational measures for dialogue and recognition of the 1990 election results. On 20 September this year, Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu called on the United Nations to discuss the Myanmar affairs. The anti-government expatriates and certain West broadcasting stations who are finding pretext are calling for pressure on the nation for dialogue under the pretext of the report of the two men.

Looking back to the history of the nation, the AFPFL government made attempts many times to gain local peace and national unity through negotiations. But it could not make any headway.

In 1962, the Revolution Council Government came into power. In 1963, the then government invited all the national race armed groups to gain internal peace. It could not make peace with all the armed groups except the Kayin armed group led by Saw Kawt Kahsa.

As all the peace negotiations were unsuccessful, the government asked for advice and suggestions after forming advisory group for internal peace. There came out no advice but U Nu’s demand for handing over the State power to him.

In the drive for gaining national reconsolidation and internal peace, in settling the disagreement on tactics, reunion can be achieved through discussions, negotiations, and mutual understanding. However, in settling the disagreement on strategy, reunion cannot be gained through discussions, negotiations and compliance.

Supposing, in tactics, one wants to go to Mandalay by car, and another, by train. If one gives in the other’s wish, and the two go to Mandalay by car or by train, surely they will arrive at the destination together. So, reunion can be gained through negotiations.

In strategy, if one who wants to go to Mandalay and another, to Yangon cannot negotiate, they will have to decide where they should go, to Mandalay or to Yangon. And one whose wish is improper will have to give in the other. Then, negotiations can be successful.

For example, when 17 national race armed groups gave up their strategy of breaking away from the Union and chose the way of cooperation, ceasefire could be established easily. And when they allied to the government, they could devotee themselves to the tasks for raising their social and economic standards, joining hands with the government.

In the Myanmar democracy movement today, the disagreements between the Tatmadaw Government and the anti-government elements led by NLD are those over strategy not over tactics. In other words, they are walking towards opposite directions not in parallel.
It is because the Tatmadaw Government’s policy for democratic transition is to ensure stability of the State, community peace, national reconsolidation, proper evolution of the market-oriented economic system, emergence of a new enduring State Constitution, and building of a discipline-flourishing modern developed democratic nation in cooperation with the party that will win the elections in accord with the new State Constitution in playing the leading role in the politics of the future nation. Its attitude is in conformity with the prevailing situations of today Myanmar as well as the correct path to democracy according to the historic events.

The policy of internal and external anti-government elements led by NLD and their supporters is to ensure exclusion of the Tatmadaw from the politics, immediate return of armed forces to the military barracks, handing over the State power without a State Constitution designating the victory in the 1990 election as election results, monopoly of State power by their party, and ruling of the State at will.

In line with their attitude, they are attempting to submit the demands and pressure of international community to the UN Security Council so that the State power will be handed over to NLD under the decision of the UN Security Council. At the same time, they are resorting to various means for NLD to come into power after ousting the Tatmadaw Government through mass demonstration like 1988 unrest resulting from the economic decline due to economic sanctions and political pressure on the nation imposed by international community. They are not only committing but also encouraging all possible wicked ways, within or without the frame of law, against the Tatmadaw Government regarding them as democracy movement.

It can be therefore deduced that the policy for democracy transition by the Tatmadaw and that by the NLD are quite different from each other.

The policy of the Tatmadaw has yielded unprecedented progress in stability of the State, community peace, tranquillity, and national reconciliation that any previous successive governments after 1948 could not achieve. It can be witnessed that today national people have enjoyed fruitful results of development in various sectors including the economic, education, health and transport sectors that the nation had never seen in the period from colonial days to 1988. Totally disregarding true situations, and considering constructive efforts to be destructive acts, and destructive acts to be constructive efforts, the destructive elements are variously putting pressures on the Tatmadaw government to fulfil the demands of the NLD. However, they said that such acts were aimed at contributing towards Myanmar’s democracy transition.

Moreover, they are accusing the Tatmadaw government of failing to implement the drive for transition to democracy.

Such misconceptions and conditions are the root cause of why any persons or organizations cannot achieve any success in reconciling the Tatmadaw government with the NLD.

Hence, the destructive elements need to thoroughly review the real evidences through an objective outlook. The Tatmadaw government held the election and convened the National Convention to formulate a State constitution, but the drive for establishment of a democracy government has not come true for 17 years, attesting to the adverse effects of the demands for dialogues.

If speedy and smooth transition to democracy is preferred, instead of clinging on to demands for dialogues,

(1) external elements in total disregard of true situations and having a bias against the Tatmadaw government should stop putting unjust pressures on the nation, and

(2) internal and external anti-government groups should assess their acts as well as the root cause of advantages enjoyed and disadvantages faced by the NLD and the people during the period of past 17 years, upholding the correct conception that judgments must be made based on tangible results to know if an act is wrong or right. Only then will it be possible to seek the most appropriate solution to the dispute over Myanmar’s politics.

Author :  Kyaw Myint Naing